Contesting procedural norms:the impact of politicisation on European foreign policy cooperation by Juncos, Ana E & Pomorska, Karolina
                          Juncos, A. E., & Pomorska, K. (2021). Contesting procedural norms:
the impact of politicisation on European foreign policy cooperation.
European Security, 30(3), 367-384.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2021.1947799
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
License (if available):
CC BY
Link to published version (if available):
10.1080/09662839.2021.1947799
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via Taylor and Francis
at https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2021.1947799 .Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the
published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/red/research-policy/pure/user-guides/ebr-terms/
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=feus20
European Security
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/feus20
Contesting procedural norms: the impact
of politicisation on European foreign policy
cooperation
Ana E. Juncos & Karolina Pomorska
To cite this article: Ana E. Juncos & Karolina Pomorska (2021) Contesting procedural norms: the
impact of politicisation on European foreign policy cooperation, European Security, 30:3, 367-384,
DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2021.1947799
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2021.1947799
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 25 Aug 2021.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 297
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 2 View citing articles 
Contesting procedural norms: the impact of politicisation on
European foreign policy cooperation
Ana E. Juncos a and Karolina Pomorska b
aSchool of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK; bInstitute of Political
Science, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
While there is increasing evidence in the literature of politicisation
in the area of European foreign policy, we know less about how this
has affected the dynamics of cooperation among EUmember states
and, specifically, the procedural norms that govern this policy. This
article is concerned with how politicisation and contestation
manifest at the micro-level and how they might shape everyday
EU foreign policy negotiations. It seeks to establish to what
extent politicisation – resulting from the emergence of a new
political cleavage centred around issues of identity and
supranational integration – has driven normative contestation
within EU foreign policy negotiations and whether this has led to
the erosion of long-standing procedural norms in European
foreign policy. Our findings suggest that despite CFSP Council
committees being an institutional arena, characterised by
intergovernmental, relatively insulated, and technical decision-
making, current processes of politicisation linked to the rise of
populism and the increasing transfer of authority to the EEAS
have increased contestation of norms within this setting.
However, procedural norms have remained relatively resilient to
these challenges.
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That European integration is increasingly politicised and contested is a well-established
argument in the scholarship (de Wilde and Zürn 2012, Grande and Hutter 2016). Politici-
sation can be defined as “an increase in polarisation of opinions, interests or values and
the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards policy formulation” (de Wilde and
Zürn 2012, p. 140). Growing politicisation in European societies has been animated by the
emergence of a new political cleavage centred on issues of identity and supranational
integration (the so-called gal-tan axis or “integration-demarcation” cleavage), which has
disrupted the “permissive consensus” that characterised European integration for many
decades and replaced it for a new “constraining dissensus” (Hooghe and Marks 2009).
It is also important to distinguish politicisation, as a long-term process, from contestation,
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as an instance or an act of opposing certain views, policy positions or norms (see Bieden-
kopf et al. forthcoming). While the introduction to this Special Issue sees contestation as a
driver of politicisation (Biedenkopf et al. forthcoming), in this paper, we switch this logic
around and seek to determine whether politicisation is creating an opportunity structure
that might favour contestation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In
other words, does politicisation increase norm contestation and if so with what effects?
Although in different ways and to different degrees, politicisation has been said to
affect most EU policies, from economic and monetary integration to immigration to EU
trade policies (Schimmelfennig et al. 2015, Young 2017). For a long time, foreign and
security policies appeared to remain insulated from such developments, not least
because of the intergovernmental and secretive nature of this policy domain (Smith
2004, Bickerton 2011, Sjursen 2012). However, there is increasing evidence in the litera-
ture of politicisation in this policy area (see Chryssogelos 2019, Costa 2019, Biedenkopf
et al. forthcoming). The politicisation of EU foreign and security policies has been
linked to the emergence of new populist parties (Liang 2008, Balfour et al. 2016, Dennison
and Pardijs 2016, Martill and Rogstad 2019), especially where those parties are in govern-
ment, and become “challenger governments” (Hodson and Puetter 2019). Increasing poli-
ticisation of the CFSP is also evident in strategic documents such as the EU Global Strategy
of 2016, although in this case, politicisation has resulted in more (rather than less) inte-
gration in EU security and defence policies (Barbé and Morillas 2019). Even when it
comes to “hard politics” such as military operations, Wagner et al. (2018) have shown
that the deployment of peace and security missions is not exempt from such dynamics.
Thus, to date, we generally have a good picture of the potential impact of politicisation
on a range of EU foreign and security policies, but we know much less about how this has
impacted the dynamics of foreign policy cooperation between member states. In this
article, we contribute to the study of politicisation of EU foreign policymaking by estab-
lishing how politicisation affects the procedural norms that sustain cooperation. In other
words, we focus on how politicisation manifests itself at the micro-level, in negotiations
within CFSP committees, and whether it might foster normative contestation. While
different norms might be contested in European foreign policy, this contribution
focuses specifically on procedural norms (norms regulating diplomatic “ways of
doing”), and in so doing, addresses a key gap in the literature, since “little consideration
has been given to the possibility that the regulatory as well as constitutive norms that
underpin EU external relations might themselves be the object of political conflict”
(Costa 2019, p. 790). To study the dynamic relationship between politicisation and norma-
tive contestation, one first needs to establish whether contestation of procedural norms
has increased in recent years; and second, whether this can be linked back to the politi-
cisation of European foreign policy.
It is also important to point out that negotiations within CFSP committees represent a
hard case of politicisation in EU foreign policy: as relatively insulated, intergovernmental
and institutional arenas operating at the lowest level (or expert level) of decision-making,
we would expect a lesser impact of politicisation than in other areas of European inte-
gration. First, one of the key assumptions has been that intergovernmental policies
have been less impacted by politicisation than those covered by the community
method (Costa 2019) as politicisation increases with the transfer of authority to suprana-
tional institutions (de Wilde and Zürn 2012). This also links to another issue raised in the
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literature regarding the distinction between low and high politics and levels of politicisa-
tion. When it comes to high politics (or “core state powers”, see Genschel and Jachten-
fuchs 2014), states will prioritise national sovereignty rather than issues of national
identity, so politicisation might be less evident in these areas, especially if unanimity is
still the prevailing decision-making rule (Schimmelfennig et al. 2015).
Second, when it comes to politicisation, it is easier to detect politicisation in citizen and
intermediary arenas – through the inclusion of new actors into public deliberations – than
in institutional arenas, which are generally dominated by the executive and bureaucratic
elites (Hurrelmann et al. 2015). The Brussels-based committees, which constitute the focus
of this article, should, in theory, be relatively insulated from politicisation as public mobil-
isation is more difficult (Costa 2019, p. 794). This is also related to a third point, here we
focus on the lowest level of decision-making, CFSP committees, including CFSP geo-
graphical and thematic working groups and the Political and Security Committee,
which are often also perceived as less politicised and thus more amenable to compromise
than higher levels of decision-making such as the Committee of Representatives and the
Council of Ministers (see Checkel 2001, Juncos and Pomorska 2011). Last, but not least,
foreign policy has been considered as an area of low politicisation or even de-politicisa-
tion as member states seek to keep deliberations beyond the scrutiny of public audiences
(Chryssogelos 2019). Secrecy tends to “cut slack” as representatives do not need to defend
their positions before domestic audiences, facilitating co-operative styles of negotiation
(Lewis 2010, p. 655). This also aligns with arguments that “security enacts a special kind
of politics that closes down political debate, escapes public scrutiny and constrains
societal deliberation” (Hegemann and Schneckener 2019, p. 135).
Our argument is that despite the CFSP Council committees being an institutional arena
characterised by intergovernmental, relatively insulated, and technical-level decision-
making, one can observe on-going processes of politicisation due to the rise of populism
and the increasing transfer of authority to institutions such as the EEAS. We argue that this
politicisation has led to increased contestation of procedural norms at the EU level. Yet,
the evidence presented here suggests that procedural norms remain rather resilient in
the face of normative contestation from “challenger governments”. To explore these pro-
cesses, we start by discussing more generally how politicisation affects European foreign
policy and the factors that drive politicisation at the international, European and domestic
level. We then explain how we understand the relationship between politicisation, norma-
tive contestation and norm robustness, drawing on constructivist scholarship. Empirically
we proceed in three steps: we first examine the extent of normative contestation of pro-
cedural norms in CFSP; second, we investigate whether this is linked to politicisation and
more specifically polarisation; third, and finally, we assess how this has affected the
robustness of procedural norms in this policy area.
The increasing politicisation of European foreign policy
Politicisation is related to the emergence of a new political cleavage centred on issues of
identity, one that sets in opposition cosmopolitans and communitarians (De Wilde et al.
2019). In European foreign policy, this cleavage drives politicisation at three levels: inter-
national, European and national.
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At the global level, there has been a gradual politicisation of governance beyond the
nation state and globalisation as a broader phenomenon (Zürn and de Wilde 2016). Con-
testation of globalisation has been accompanied by the rise of populist movements and
political parties and the contestation of (Western) liberal democracy across the world. As a
consequence, we have witnessed an increasing backlash and contestation, with populists
blaming globalisation “for a dilution of national distinctiveness and loss of jobs” (Zürn and
de Wilde 2016, p. 280). To quote Chryssogelos (2019, p. 608), the process of de-politicisa-
tion associated with globalisation has carried with it “the seeds of its own re-politicisa-
tion”. Politicisation has been linked to the increasing transfer of authority to
supranational institutions (de Wilde and Zürn 2012), and also to the rejection of traditional
Western liberal norms, such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law (Sandholtz
and Stiles 2009).
At the European level, continuous progress in authority transfer from the nation state
to the EU has also resulted in politicisation in the post-Maastricht period, including in the
area of foreign and security policy. Eurosceptic parties have opposed the gradual transfer
of competences to European institutions in the name of national sovereignty. These argu-
ments have been recently fuelled by the Eurozone debt crisis, the refugee crisis and, more
recently, the Covid-19 pandemic, leading to border closures and nationalist responses
(Borriello and Brack 2019, Braw 2020). But, at the same time, the fallout of these crises
has resulted in new integrationist moves, whether in the area of migration (with the cre-
ation of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency) or the Covid-19 pandemic (with
the Next Generation EU recovery fund), feeding the politicisation cycle. In the case of
foreign and security policies, even though CFSP is still presented as a textbook
example of intergovernmental governance, the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into
force in 2009, was considered by many insiders as revolutionary (Duke 2008). It introduced
the possibility of more supranational integration in defence, which is currently taking
shape in the form of PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation). The creation of the
double-hatted High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP) and
the European External Action Service (EEAS) both strengthened the Brussels-based
system of European foreign policymaking, while the Commission Delegations were trans-
formed into EU Delegations around the world. For instance, both the HRVP and the EEAS
were given agenda-setting powers (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013) posing a key chal-
lenge to national diplomatic services (Adler-Nissen 2014). In the post-Lisbon period, the
European Commission has expanded its so far modest role in the field of security, includ-
ing with the launch of the European Defence Fund (Haroche 2019). All these develop-
ments have the potential to increase politicisation, and thus contestation, in CFSP as
they represent the shift of traditional member states’ functions to the European level in
the areas of “core state powers” (Hofmann 2013, Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014).
Thus, while institutional changes point towards a more supranational CFSP, we have
also seen a “backlash” on the part of the member states resorting to informal channels
(Aggestam and Bicchi 2019).
Simultaneously, at the domestic level, we have witnessed populist parties coming into
power over the past decade. This has been the case with the Fidesz party led by Viktor
Orban in Hungary since 2010 and the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland since 2015,
although other populist parties have achieved positions of authority in governments,
such as the ANO party in the Czech Republic, Greece’s Syriza government, Italy’s
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League and Five Star Movement coalition or Austria’s ÖVP/FPÖ coalition. The emerging
literature on populism and foreign policy shows that populist right radical parties tend
to be opposed to EU integration, citing migration issues and “the loss of sovereignty”
(Verbeek and Zaslove 2017, p. 19, see also Varga and Buzogány 2020). Some fundamental
norms behind European foreign policy are likely to clash with the domestic agendas of far
right populists, especially those related to questions of solidarity. For example, sover-
eignty is often defined in countries like Hungary or Poland as opposed to the EU’s “inter-
fering” in domestic politics especially in the areas of the rule of law and migration (Coman
and Leconte 2019). Yet, recent research has also noted that there is still a high degree of
divergence regarding these parties’ policy preferences in foreign policy (Falkner and Platt-
ner 2019). Moreover, an initial study of the impact of populism on Indian foreign policy
(Plagemann and Destradi 2019) has shown that the arrival of populist parties affected pro-
cedural norms rather than constitutive norms in the area of foreign policy. This article con-
tributes empirically to this literature by looking at the case of CFSP negotiations.
The preceding discussion shows how the politicisation of EU foreign policy in the post-
Lisbon era is driven by the opening of the communitarian vs. cosmopolitan divide across
these three different levels rather than a single one of them. It already points to the fact
that politicisation in CFSP negotiations is likely to take the form of a more intense political
conflict or polarisation as positions between different actors move further apart from each
other (Biedenkopf et al. forthcoming). But before we examine the potential impact of poli-
ticisation on normative contestation in CFSP, it is important to clarify what we mean by
normative contestation and norm robustness.
Conceptualising norm contestation and norm robustness
Rather than seeing norms as static, this article seeks to understand whether and to what
extent increasing politicisation has challenged, undermined or transformed CFSP pro-
cedural norms. This is in line with current research on norms, which has examined the
dynamism, changes and strength/robustness of norms in different periods and across
contexts (Zimmerman 2017). Norm contestation can be understood as a relevant factor
explaining variation in norm robustness and potential norm erosion. Here we draw on
the work of Antje Wiener, who defines norm contestation as an “interactive social prac-
tice”, which expresses “disapproval” of particular norms. She also distinguishes
between fundamental, organising principles and standardised procedures (Wiener
2014, p. 2). In this article, we follow a slightly different categorisation of norms by dis-
tinguishing between procedural and constitutive norms (see also Thomas 2009, Michalski
and Danielson 2019).
Constitutive norms refer to the “foundational values and principles” of the EU
(Michalski and Danielson 2019, p. 334) and include norms, such as peace, liberty, democ-
racy, rule of law and human rights (Manners 2002) or the “support for democracy and the
rule of law, human rights, conflict prevention, the strengthening of multilateral insti-
tutions, free trade and the promotion of development” (Thomas 2009, p. 344). By contrast,
procedural norms refer to the “code of conduct” or rules of the game; in other words, the
appropriate behaviour an individual should adopt within a particular group in a particular
situation (Juncos and Pomorska 2006). According to Michael E. Smith, what started as
“informal customs […] that emerged in day-to-day interactions among EPC officials”
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would become codified into “explicit, written norms” over time (Smith 2004, p. 117). The
development of these practices was the result of a trial and error process. Among these
procedural norms, co-ordination reflex, consensus-building and domaines réservés are
most frequently mentioned in the literature. They are said to have been at work since
the 1970s with the creation of the EPC (Juncos and Pomorska 2006, 2011). It is worth men-
tioning that some of these practices, such as consensus-building, are not exclusive to
CFSP policy-making, but can be found in other EU policy areas (Lewis 2010). The fact
that there are no enforceable mechanisms in this field and that unanimity is the rule,
however, makes their existence ever more significant. Other practices have been docu-
mented in the literature, such as confidentiality and the prohibition of hard-bargaining
(Smith 2004, pp. 122–124); the obligation to justify national positions (Winn and Lord
2001, p. 27); respect for “agreed language” (Smith 2004, p. 124); or those mentioned by
the interviewees such as ensuring vertical and horizontal consistency. Thomas (2009,
p. 344) also argues that there are two “meta norms” that guide EU foreign policy nego-
tiations: “joint action as an intrinsic value, including support for the functionality and
credibility of the EU as a global actor; and consistency and coherence in EU policy-
making across time and issue-areas”.
According to Wiener (2014, p. 2), normative contestation can be performed either
explicitly (by directly challenging or questioning a norm) or implicitly (by ignoring or dis-
regarding it); it can be “voiced or voiceless” (Wiener 2014, p. 2). Wiener understands norm
contestation as intrinsically linked to social change, rather than the maintenance of the
status quo, as “it always involves a critical redress of the rules of the game” (Wiener
2014, p. 2). Normative contestation is a particularly relevant and expected phenomenon
in international relations as diversity makes the shared recognition of normative mean-
ings less likely and increases the potential for clashes about norms (Wiener 2014). In
this contribution, we argue that by increasing value divergence among EU member
states, politicisation in the form of polarisation makes normative contestation more likely.
There is no agreement in the literature, however, on whether normative contestation
strengthens or weakens norms. Wiener (2014) has a more positive understanding of con-
testation as it can trigger processes that legitimise norms. In other cases, normative con-
testation has been seen to strengthen norms, such as in the case of the Responsibility to
Protect, by clarifying its scope of application (Badescu and Weiss 2010). Yet, too much
contestation can also undermine norms (Panke and Petersohn 2012). For instance,
norm contestation from powerful “norm challengers” can result in the decline of some
norms (McKeown 2009). Hence, this article also contributes to research that seeks to
determine the impact of contestation on norm robustness.
Following Deitelhoff and Zimmermann (2019, p. 3), norm robustness is understood
here in terms of validity and facticity: “norm robustness is said to be ‘high’ when its
claims are widely accepted by norm addressees (validity) and generally guide the
actions of these addressees (facticity).” The impact of contestation on norm robustness
varies depending on a number of actor-related factors (e.g. how powerful the challenger
or group of challengers is) and structural-related factors (the degree of institutionalisation,
normative embeddedness, legal quality) (Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2019, pp. 9–12).
Both actor and structural-related factors will be explored in this article when examining
norm robustness.
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To determine the impact of contestation on norm robustness, we use empirical indi-
cators of norm robustness/erosion that combine both discursive (e.g. third-party reactions
to norm violation) and practice approaches (e.g. behaviour consistent with the norm)
since focusing only on one or the other is not enough to determine whether contestation
has undermined the norm (Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2019, pp. 6–7). The empirical evi-
dence for this article comes from qualitative interviews conducted by the authors in Brus-
sels between 2017 and 2019. The data were collected through interviews with national
representatives to the thematic and geographical CFSP/CSDP Council working groups
and committees, as well as officials working for the European External Action Service
(EEAS), who had regularly chaired those working groups or committees and/or attended
such meetings. In total, 40 interviews, lasting approximately one hour, were conducted for
the purposes of this research. Interviews are coded to maintain the anonymity of the
interviewees.
The contestation of procedural norms in EU foreign policy
It is important to remember that there has always been contestation of specific decisions
in CFSP negotiations and that, as many interviewees mentioned, there is always room for
voicing ones’ objections within Council meetings. One of the diplomats put it as follows:
“the thinking that we can always have consensus is idealistic” (22; also 28). There was
agreement on the importance of procedural norms, yet interviewees also noted a
pattern of increasing contestation in day-to-day negotiations in CFSP committees in
the post-Lisbon period. The most expressed irritation was caused by incidents where
the consensus-building norm was not respected, with some representatives summing
up their frustration as “It is impossible to come up with a common position!” (37). Inter-
viewees were not only frustrated with the blocking of particular decisions, but with the
fact that the usual “way-of-doing-things” was not being respected, in other words, pro-
cedural norms themselves became the object of contestation. By contrast, while some
countries might often block decisions, they were still considered to be acting in a “pro-
fessional” way if they respected these norms:
Somemember states have issues blocking; others not so much. France is happy to threaten to
block at any level – but they are very efficient using other means of influence. The Nether-
lands is a middle size country, they are outspoken, but [there are] no negative perceptions
because they block lots of things (enlargement, debt-eurozone), because they are very pro-
fessional, so it is difficult to criticise them. (30)
Since there have always been member states opposing particular decisions, whether
some behaviours challenge long-established norms or just constitute the “normal” in
European foreign policy cooperation requires careful examination. To establish whether
a discourse or behaviour amounts to normative contestation, one needs to look at how
contestation operates. Drawing on our empirical evidence, it became clear that intervie-
wees saw these as instances of non-compliance with the norm of consensus-building
when (1) national diplomats challenged the consensus without any clear justification;
(2) it was always the same representatives that became isolated within the group; (3)
the national representative went against previously agreed positions within the commit-
tee. In this respect, the interviewees singled out Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Poland –
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both of them with far right populist parties in government – as the norm violators (e.g. 21,
27, 39, 40).
First, it is generally accepted that member states can threaten the use of veto in the
intergovernmental arena of CFSP where national interests might be compromised, the
so-called red lines (32, 34). It happens to most representatives that, from time to time,
they will have instructions putting them at odds with the vast majority of national pos-
itions due to vital national interests. In those situations, they can contest the majority’s
agreement as long as they publicly justify their position. This would not fall within the cat-
egory of norm contestation (i.e. contesting the norm of consensus-building) as it is
covered by one of the exceptions (protecting a vital national interest). One interviewee
put it: “You can challenge consensus if there is a clear national interest, then this is
accepted” (28). Opposing where there is a long-standing national interest at stake is per-
ceived to be reasonable (see also Michalski and Danielson 2019, p. 13), but needs to be
justified (29). By contrast, interviewees considered that contestation was unjustified if,
despite an issue not being politically salient, it was used by a national government for
domestic political reasons (22, 37). Thus, the perceived reason for undermining the con-
sensus was considered important. As Aus puts it, EU negotiations are usually driven by the
logic of “if you oppose, you have to speak up” (in Smeets 2015, p. 300). It also explains why
officials also tend to avoid being isolated as it is more difficult to justify one’s position
when no other country supports it.
Second, if it is always the same representatives opposing decisions, this will also be
considered to breach the code of conduct. Scholarship on CFSP negotiations had, for
instance, identified an established norm of “not making trouble” and not becoming reg-
ularly isolated within one’s group (Juncos and Pomorska 2006). According to an intervie-
wee “you never want to be the last one to say no. You feel the pressure, so you try and
build consensus” (29). Or another one: “We need to be in coalitions, otherwise you look
like a troublemaker” (24). This is closely linked to the norm of “keeping everyone on-
board” in the process of consensus-seeking. Officials need to “pick their battles” and
cannot “raise their flag on too many issues” (Smeets 2015, p. 300; also interview 28) as
this might reduce their legitimacy and effectiveness within the group. Although it was
acknowledged that larger member states might be forceful during negotiations, there
is a limit to what they can do: “If they press too much, the others will resent that” (24).
Finally, another important procedural norm is the need to maintain horizontal and ver-
tical consistency. This means not re-opening issues that were once closed within the com-
mittee or at a lower level of negotiations, i.e. agreed at other thematic or geographical
committee meetings. National diplomats also need to respect the “agreed language”
within the group and previous compromises on a specific issue. As explained by a
diplomat:
You should never be in a position that you do a U-turn, this would undermine your credibility.
You can change your position because you are forced by others or because other issues are
linked. But U-turns are not good because they undermine the reputation of the representa-
tive and the nation. (34)
Post-Lisbon developments provide evidence of contestation of long-standing norms in
CFSP. This is especially the case when it comes to Hungary, whose “capital did not mind
being isolated” (21). One of the interviewees described the behaviour of Hungarian
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diplomats as though “they are not afraid of anything” (18), which may be interpreted as
not being afraid of social pressure and violating the well-established procedural norms.
Alongside Hungary, Poland was also mentioned as contesting the agreed norms. A diplo-
mat saw this as “blocking for blocking” (28) and yet another one expressed in the follow-
ing manner: “There is silly and disruptive behavior of Hungary and Poland. They have no
interest in taking into account the opinion of others. It’s sad” (21). Another added: “For
Hungary and Poland it is true that it is more important what they say than what they
achieve” (25). A Polish diplomat put this rather bluntly: “It is not that important
whether we achieve anything, but it is important that our voice is heard” (19). For
many of these representatives, the performative and symbolic nature of these actions
(especially vis-à-vis domestic audiences) was more important than achieving a particular
policy outcome. Michalski and Danielson (2019, p. 10) also found that certain PSC ambas-
sadors did not mind being “seen as obstructive” and blocking decisions even where the
national interest was not at stake. A similar attitude could be observed in a much higher
setting, during the vote on the extension of the mandate for the European Council Pre-
sident Donald Tusk, when Poland seemed relaxed about being isolated and called for a
formal vote, which they lost 27-1 (37).
Moreover, vertical and horizontal consistency was now seen as not respected by
countries which, once issues were agreed, would “come later and block” (22). A diplomat
explained the case of a proposal that had been negotiated during months and where the
Hungarian representative had not raised any issues during those long negotiations. A
sudden change in the country’s position was described as “taking the issue hostage at
the political level at the last minute” (40). According to this official this undermined the
credibility of the country. “Unpredictability” was highlighted as a recurrent problem, for
instance, regarding Hungary’s position on Belarus and Russia (27). Again, the context of
these actions was considered important. It was not just the blocking, but also the percep-
tion that the reason was not linked to the specific item. Instead, it was clearly linked to
domestic politics (and for domestic audiences), with those representatives failing to prop-
erly explain the national interest at stake at given situations.
As mentioned in the literature, breaking these norms incurs costs on the national
representative, and also the member state as a whole (Lewis 2005, Juncos and
Pomorska 2006, Smeets 2015). According to James Cross (2011, p. 51) “making an inter-
vention has costs associated with it, in terms of political capital”. Obstructing becomes
politically costly when it results in excessive exposure (Smeets 2015, p. 300). The inter-
esting thing is that countries such as Hungary do not seem to care about costs at the
European level. On the contrary, they seem to relish the possibility of obstructing
things at the EU level for domestic gains. But costs there are, particularly, reputational
costs which also result in the reduced effectiveness of national representatives in EU
negotiations. For instance, their strategies within Brussels-committees have had a
negative impact on the effectiveness of Hungarian representatives and perceptions
among other colleagues (20; 25). As mentioned by one official, “Hungary at the
moment has a very negative image; while a country such the Netherlands might
block as much as Hungary”, but their image is not so bad (30). According to
another: “The present [Hungarian] government puts migration higher; Czechs too
but they don’t behave like this” (36). As a result of this behaviour, Hungary has
become the “black sheep” or a pariah state in EU foreign policy circles because of
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the lack of compliance with long-established procedural (and substantive) norms. In a
survey carried out by the European Council of Foreign Relation on coalition building, it
was concluded that
[d]espite the often frustrating cluelessness of the United Kingdom in its Brexit negotiations,
Hungary has still managed to surpass Britain as the most “disappointing” member state, in
the eyes of respondents. Disappointment with Hungary ranked especially high among the
EU’s founding members and its affluent mid-sized states. (Vegh 2019)
A Polish representative also acknowledged that “issues regarding the rule of law in
Poland, complicate our ability to build coalitions” (30; also 18, 20). Meanwhile, the
Polish and Hungarian governments have often argued that they are held to different,
higher, standards than the rest of the Union. For example, Poland’s Prime Minister,
Mateusz Morawiecki, argued that some member states are treated differently and that
EU officials treat Poland as a “scapegoat” (Business Insider 2019). In sum, behaviour
that clashes with procedural norms has resulted in reputational costs and sometimes
impatience on the part of other member states. But, these diplomats from far right popu-
list governments might be leveraging losses at EU level for symbolic gain at the domestic
level and so are happy to blame the EU.
Why does normative contestation occur?
To what extent does politicisation explain the increase in normative contestation in
CFSP negotiations? Several reasons might explain the contestation of procedural
norms, all of which can be linked back to increasing politicisation. First, contestation
can happen because procedural norms are misunderstood or their significance is not
well-appreciated either in the Brussels-based Permanent Representations or in the capi-
tals (or both). However, considering the evidence from the literature on enlargement
and socialisation processes within the Council (Juncos and Pomorska 2008, Lewis
2010), it is hard to ascribe contestation to ignorance or misunderstanding of the
norm in the Brussels realm. Member state capitals have always been slower in
taking on-board the informal ways-of-doing-things, but Brussels-based diplomats
have been acting for decades as “transmission belts”, explaining the negotiating
environment to their masters back at home. Having said that there was a perception
by some diplomats that the understanding of the EU at “higher levels” had decreased
in some countries where radical right populist governments are in place (19). In
Poland, it was mentioned that “the current government has an anti-elitist profile –
civil servants are seen as the elite and critical to the government […] more than exper-
tise they value loyalty” (30).
The second reason to consider is the normative clash between norms in Brussels and
those at home. It has been mentioned in the literature that national diplomats operate in
hybrid settings (Lewis 2005). While the Janus-face nature of diplomatic work has remained
a constant, in a more polarised world, especially where populist governments are in
power, the trade-offs of following European vs. domestic norms have been significantly
altered. If the consensus-building mode of negotiations is considered inappropriate or
as sign of weakness at home, the national representatives will then face a dilemma of
which norm to follow. As their career is usually tied to a national Ministry of Foreign
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Affairs, there is a strong incentive to follow domestic norms. This is especially the case
when diplomats feel that their effectiveness (understood in terms of achieving a compro-
mise) is only secondary to the need to make their voices heard (18, 19). Again, Hungary
and Poland were mentioned as cases in point. In the eyes of these governments, blocking
is “not a weakness” (19) but “about heroism back at home” (21). Gains at the domestic
level outweigh any political or reputational costs at the EU level.
The third reason for contestation is the view, among some representatives, that further
integration, especially with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, has reduced the ability of
member states to control foreign policy: “we have now the EU in more areas, removing
the space for member states after Lisbon” (37), remarked one interviewee. This supports
the argument that politicisation has been fuelled by increasing transfers of authority at
the EU level. As Aggestam and Johansson (2017) have also shown, national and EEAS dip-
lomats have divergent expectations (or role conflicts) about who should exercise leader-
ship in relation to different tasks (e.g. agenda-setting, delivering proposals or external
representation). Agenda-setting and chairing of the meetings are particularly sensitive
for national diplomats. For instance, member states complain that with the HRVP and
the EEAS now taking up this responsibility, they have lost ownership of the agenda
and are less compelled to find an agreement:
Before the EEAS, we knew we had to find solutions. […] Now, with the EEAS, member states
just say: “this is not acceptable – you find the way!” The EEAS complicates things, always
applying different rules and you never know which they will apply so you don’t focus on
the substance. (23)
As member states realise the consequences of the transfer of competences to EU insti-
tutions such as the EEAS, they have sought to “roll back” or informally take back
control by moving negotiations to higher (and more politicised) levels such as
COREPER and the FAC or via bilateral negotiations or like-minded groups (see Aggestam
and Bicchi 2019). Moreover, there is a feeling that only some countries are able to
influence EU institutions and that this increases the power imbalances within the EU
(big member states vs. small member states; old vs. new member states; North vs.
South). As summarised by an interviewee: “There is an unequal access to the institutions
[… .] and this is partly why these countries have become assertive” (24). The replacement
of the rotating Presidency has had the effect of decreasing the sense of ownership among
EU member states and previous expectations of reciprocity and solidarity:
when you were in the chair [pre-Lisbon], you learnt a lot about the system. There was a learn-
ing effect with the Presidency […] As colleagues rotated, there was a sense of solidarity […]
You realised: “I will be in that chair and I’ll need to be solution-oriented”. […] The fact is that
the Hungarian colleague will never be in the chair now […] Gone is the necessity to play this
game, diminished by the fact that there is an impersonal institution at the helm. (39)
By removing this sense of reciprocity and solidary, the increasing transfer of authority
at the EU level has thus contributed to increasing levels of polarisation, with member
states positions moving further apart from each other. It is in this context that we can
expect increasing contestation of procedural norms such as consensus building.
Last, but not least, contestation of procedural norms is linked to domestic politics,
namely, the rise of populism turn and the arrival of far right populist parties to govern-
ment (Meunier and Vachudova 2018, Michalski and Danielson 2019, p. 12). One
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interviewee stressed: “For a populist government, it is good to be seen at home as the one
blocking consensus” (28). Polarisation in the area of CFSP has led to the emergence of two
distinctive poles in relation to liberal values, especially where they touch upon issues of
immigration and human rights. During the interviews, some national diplomats expressed
their frustration with countries blocking or vetoing decisions on issues relating to immi-
gration, the rule of law or human rights, including sexual reproductive health rights (21,
25, 26, 30, 40). Again, it is worth noting that diplomats do not question the right of an EU
member state to block decisions where a national interest is at stake, but they question
the lack of support/compliance with long-standing EU norms. As expressed by one diplo-
mat: “There is a tendency from a few countries of going towards less value-based inter-
ventions” (21). Another national representative said: “it is a nuisance when blocking
happens on issues we should all believe in, on gender [equality], on values, on the pos-
ition we take on human rights” (25).
While “constructive ambiguity”might allow EU member states to arrive to a consensus
on issues as controversial as these ones, there have been several instances where some
member states have not even made the effort. The most prominent example is
Hungary, which has become very assertive on “human rights, LGBT, migration” (24; 23;
on migration also 26). “In the case of Hungary they are only vocal on one issue (migration)
and they see everything we do through those lenses (e.g. CSDP operations)” (29). One
official stated: “Hungarians are less constructive, for example on migration, it is a trans-
lation of domestic politics” (36).
Disagreements over core values (including rule of law issues and LGTB rights) have also
increased the divide between Eastern and Western member states where these policies
might be seen to clash with domestic pro-family oriented policies (see Eurobarometer
2018). As mentioned by one representative, “a set of countries in Central and Eastern
Europe now try to soften the EU’s voice on human rights. This didn’t use to be the
case some years ago” (29). While older member states see with suspicion and even con-
tempt what they perceive as threats to the EU’s core liberal values, Eastern member states
resist what they see as an attack from the EU on domestically salient conservative prin-
ciples. CEEs’ assertiveness also evidences a gradual process of learning: “It is a product
of direct experience of these states that led them to be like this” (24) or “They (the
CEEs) did not use to speak so much, but now they are more confident, more used to
EU negotiations” (29).
Several interviewees referred to the impact of far right populist governments on EU
decision-making, the agenda and negotiations, particularly at higher levels (FAC, Euro-
pean Council) (23, 29, 31). These governments tend to conduct a foreign policy that is
more driven by “isolationist nationalism” (we can do it on our own) (25). In the case of
Poland, it was mentioned that
the narrative in Poland has changed. We are now saying that Europe should be a conglom-
erate of nations. This change of narrative made a difference also at the lower level […] We
have instructions not to move beyond what is necessary. (20)
As summarised by an interviewee: “Some governments don’t care about their reputation.
Their domestic situation is more important. They use their blocking here to gain advan-
tage at home. It is not the same atmosphere now” (37). This impact has been particularly
felt in some areas: “CSDP [is now] at the service of migration control. And making a link
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between migration and security, saying that they are directly linked when they are not”
(31; also 35).
In sum, we can conclude that while there might be issues regarding coordination or
misunderstanding between diplomats at home and those at the EU level, most of the
explanations above relate to the increasing politicisation of European foreign policy
and can be seen as specific expressions of the conflict between cosmopolitans and com-
munitarians (e.g. policies of far right populist governments, resistance against the expan-
sive role of the High Representative and the EEAS), which make the clash between EU
norms (including procedural norms) and domestic norms more likely. The question
remains to what extent these developments have eroded procedural norms. It is to this
issue that the final section turns.
Assessing the robustness of procedural norms
Despite the increasing contestation of procedural norms, most national diplomats
acknowledged the continued prevalence procedural norms, such as consensus building
or reflex coordination, and did not question the validity of these norms, even though
there were differences in how certain norms were interpreted or prioritised by national
diplomats. Most procedural norms were said to be informal in character and, therefore,
no legal “punishment” was foreseen for acting against the spirit of the norm. However,
there was a strong sense of social control and peer-pressure to respect the norms into
which newcomers are socialised. As summarised by an interviewee “The norms in the
PSC show themselves when someone does not comply. Most of the people are seasoned
diplomats, polite, good observers but there is resistance when someone does not observe
the norms” (25). Hence, the facticity of the norm (behavioural compliance) is still strong,
both in terms of what they think about their own behaviour and that of others. As sum-
marised by a representative “there are some rules of the game, there is a consensus rule”
(38). Finding a compromise continues to be the strongest incentive for most representa-
tives, and while contesting particular issues is possible, representatives need to achieve a
compromise at the end of the day: “we need to move forward, we need to have a
common agenda, so this cannot happen a lot. That realisation is shared by everyone” (31).
Even though normative contestation has happened, rather than weakening procedural
norms or being understood as a valid exemption, it has actually reinforced those norms by
triggering condemnation by other states. Specific instances of non-compliance do not
always amount to contestation if they go unnoticed or are not explicitly presented as vio-
lations of the norm, but in the examples mentioned in the previous sections, officials
repeatedly acknowledged the relevance of procedural norms and tried to “shame”
Hungary and other member states that might be seen to breach the norms. National dip-
lomats are also able to identify “appropriate” and less appropriate ways to challenge con-
sensus and ways of behaving accordingly.
To explain the impact of contestation on norm robustness in this case it is worth
looking into actor-related and structural factors (Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2019,
pp. 9–12). Regarding the first category, normative contestation of procedural norms
has been mostly limited to a number of member states: Hungary, Poland and to some
extent, Italy and Greece. In contrast to substantive norms such as the protection of
human rights or the rule of law, where an increasing number of countries have joined
EUROPEAN SECURITY 379
the challengers (especially in relation to migration), procedural norms have only been
contested by a handful of states. That it is always “the same countries” matters as it is
not just a case of non-compliance due to lack of knowledge or experience. This is also
how it is perceived by others: “it becomes more irritating if it is the same countries. For
example, if you say something contrary to the agreed language, then once it is OK,
twice is nagging” (25). That it is only a small group of member states and that the
biggest member states (i.e. France and Germany) have not joined the group of challen-
gers might also explain why these instances of norm contestation have not undermined
the robustness of the norms.
Structural factors might also go some way in explaining why these procedural norms
remain relatively resilient in the face of contestation. Here, it is interesting to compare
contestation of substantive norms with that of procedural norms, with the latter generally
showing a higher degree of robustness than the former for a number of reasons. First, and
more obviously, substantive norms, such as democracy or human rights, are more political
in nature than procedural norms, and that makes substantive norms more likely to be the
target of contestation, especially in the current context of populist politics. As we men-
tioned earlier, where procedural norms have been contested, it is because of their links
to substantive norms. For their part, procedural norms are better defined (less vague)
than substantive norms, which also invites less contestation. Procedural norms tend to
be better specified and have a narrower scope of application, while many of the substan-
tive norms are not so well specified, and they require specification or operationalisation in
each case. The operationalisation of substantive norms means that they are always
subject to contestation (Puetter and Wiener 2007, p. 166). One might also advance
another explanation, which is that procedural norms are transmitted through professional
training (diplomatic training) and they become routinised/habits (Pouliot 2008), making
them more resilient to contestation (Percy 2019, p. 136). Finally, it might just have to
do with the very nature of CFSP cooperation, with process being more important than
substance in the work of the Council (or at least it might be seen this way by the partici-
pants). National diplomats see compliance with procedural norms as a necessary form of
managing complex multilateral negotiations, making compromise possible or easier (29,
33, 35). Ultimately, these norms are critical to what CFSP is about: a system of cooperation
(see also Maurer and Wright, 2021).
Conclusion
This article has shown that the polarisation resulting from the rise of populism and an
“illiberal turn” has increased the likelihood of normative contestation in CFSP. It has
shown the implications of the intergovernmental institutionalisation of the cosmopolitan
– communitarian cleavage at the EU-level and, in particular, in EU foreign policy. While
contestation over specific policy decisions is normal in EU foreign policy negotiations,
especially where vital national interests are at stake, in recent years we have witnessed
more instances of contestation of procedural norms, e.g. consensus building, the need
to consult with or inform others, to avoid becoming isolated within the group or to main-
tain horizontal and vertical consistency at different stages/levels of the decision-making
process. Developments post-Lisbon provide evidence of such occurrences, particularly
involving Hungary, Poland and other representatives from far right populist governments.
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The empirical examples discussed in this article point to an increasing reluctance or even
disregard on the part of diplomats from these countries to follow “the rules of the game”.
In line with the literature on norms, this article has shown that when norms at the EU
level clash with domestic norms, and when they become salient, then we can expect con-
testation to happen. Procedural norms are more likely to be contested if there is a “misfit”
with how far right populist governments (re-)define domestic norms. For instance, the
norm of consensus-building may be seen by these populist governments as opposed
to strong national sovereignty. Polish politicians, for example, have questioned the funda-
mental principle of solidarity, proposing instead “flexible solidarity”, which underpins
European political cooperation. Being ready to accept compromise is thus understood
as a “weakness”, rather than as part of effective European decision-making process,
especially regarding issues or debates which might reach the public.
Populism has also altered the cost–benefit calculation, whereby breaking procedural
norms at the EU level resulted in excessively high costs (policy-related, reputational or
both) for national representatives. Instead, radical right populist governments seem to
welcome the domestic benefits of being a “trouble-maker” in Europe. Nowadays, it is
more salient to signal to their electorate that they are ready to fight for the national inter-
est such in the case of the Polish vote on the prolongation of term of office for European
Council president Donald Tusk. In a similar vein, at the lower levels of decision-making,
representatives may be expected to act more as “national champions”, rather than com-
promise-seeking negotiators. In sum, a lot of contestation of procedural norms in CFSP
negotiations has to do with the “domestication” of foreign policy, with EU foreign
policy debates being hijacked by domestic issues.
However, despite the increasing polarisation in European foreign policy, procedural
norms appear, so far, rather resilient to such attacks. A lot has to do with the (habitual)
nature of these norms, their more specific content and their transmission through diplo-
matic training. The fact that a majority of national representatives still acknowledges the
existence of these norms and are willing to shame those that break the standing rules of
the game also provides evidence of their resilience to date. Whether this will remain the
case in the long term will depend on whether other more powerful member states choose
to join the group of norm challengers.
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